


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Watch Committee


Watch Report

NSA review completed

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COMBINED WATCH REPORT
of the
UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

No. 1258

3 October 1974
(As of 1400 EDT)

The Committee concludes that there will be no military attack on the United States or its overseas forces in the near future. Subjects of immediate concern are discussed below.

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I. Middle East

We continue to believe that an outbreak of large-scale Arab-Israeli hostilities is unlikely in the immediate future, but each side remains vigilant and there is a greater chance of incidents during the period of the anniversary of the October 1973 war. A series of events in October -- including Secretary Kissinger's visit to the area, Egyptian Foreign Minister Fahmi's trip to Moscow and the Arab summit conference -- could significantly influence the course of events toward peace or war. Unless diplomatic efforts to reach a peaceful solution show progress soon, the risk of renewed fighting will substantially increase.

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We expect further clashes between the armed forces of Baghdad and Tehran, as Iran continues its support in order to help the Kurds stop the Iraqi pre-winter offensive. The threat, therefore, of a major Iraqi-Iranian border conflict persists.

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II. USSR-Eastern Europe

We see no indications of hostile intent in the military activity of the USSR and other Warsaw Pact nations.

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III. Southeast Asia

In South Vietnam, the sharpest military activity will continue to be concentrated in Military Region 1. We expect an increase in Communist activity in northern MR 2 within the next month.

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IV. Southeast Asia

For the near term, we expect further sharp Communist attacks in South Vietnam. In recent weeks there have been signs that Hanoi may have decided to adopt more aggressive tactics. We fully expect the South Vietnamese government will come under increasing pressure over the next few months. The deteriorating logistic posture of the South Vietnamese armed forces, coupled with anticipated reductions in US military aid, will adversely affect the Thieu government's defenses against that pressure.

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